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ABSTRACT 
As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy 
will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation.  In addition to 
proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from 
cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of 
conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal.  Radiation detection 
technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for 
nonproliferation.  As nuclear energy and hence nuclear materials become an increasingly global 
phenomenon, using local technologies and capabilities facilitate incorporation of enhanced 
monitoring and detection on the regional level. 
Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation and 
countering radiological / nuclear terrorism.  A variety of new developments have enabled 
enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, passive detection, 
predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment 
in the field. 
For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial 
resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity many-fold at reasonable 
standoff distances and acquisition times.  New materials and approaches are being developed in 
order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen.  
Different detection algorithms enable fissile materials to be distinguished from other 
radioisotopes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of nuclear proliferation prevention is to eliminate uncontrolled access to 
materials, information, and expertise by potential proliferators.  Perhaps the most technically 
challenging aspect of this objective is intercepting the illicit transport of radiological and/or 
nuclear material from source locations to the end-user.  This technical challenge is two-fold: 
detecting material of interest and monitoring transit routes.  Radiological and/or nuclear material 
of interest can have intrinsically subtle signatures, be shielded to mask the signature, or have 
signatures similar to non-threatening material.  Transit routes can vary from single, highly 
monitored exits at controlled storage facilities to uncontrolled borders in rugged mountains or 
along remote coastlines. 
There is a global expectation that we are on the threshold of a significant expansion in the 
civilian nuclear power industry.  There are many proliferation challenges associated with this 
expansion and ample uncertainty in how the global supplier and user network will operate.  But 
it is a certainty that an increase in the civilian use of nuclear power will be accompanied by an 
increase in the amount of nuclear material in global transit.  Improved detection and monitoring 
technology will be central to proliferation-resistant nuclear energy development.  This paper will 
explore some emerging concepts for this. 
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In this paper we will also briefly overview a selection recent technical advances in detection 
and monitoring made in part through the collaboration among the Institute of Nuclear Physics of 
Uzbekistan and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  Improving technology performance 
is through increasing resolution, sensitivity, stand-off distance, and ruggedness while decreasing 
acquisition time and cost.  These can be achieved with improved gamma ray imaging, use of new 
detector materials, improved detector algorithms, and developing new monitoring concepts. 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
The increasing global demand for energy and rapidly rising costs for fossil fuels indicates 
that there will soon be large increases in the use of nuclear energy.  One consequence of this 
expansion is that the amount of nuclear material in transit from suppliers to users to reprocessors 
/ disposers will dramatically increase.  In addition, as markets expand and change, the routes of 
transport of nuclear fuel will also change.  These changes in quantity and direction will challenge 
efforts to secure shipments of nuclear material that can be attractive to terrorist forces.   
GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP 
Global nuclear energy commerce requires global cooperation in nonproliferation and this is 
the a key part of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) mission.  A nuclear fuel cycle 
(Figure 1) that enhances energy security, while promoting non-proliferation is the GNEP 
objective.  It would achieve this goal by having nations with secure, advanced nuclear 
capabilities provide fuel services — fresh fuel and recovery of used fuel — to other nations who 
agree to employ nuclear energy for power generation purposes only.   
 
Figure 1: An illustration of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.  The GNEP model is to have nations with 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities provide a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply to countries that agree 
to employ it for power generation only. 
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The closed fuel cycle model envisioned by this partnership requires development and 
deployment of technologies that enable recycling and consumption of long-lived radioactive 
waste.  GNEP would demonstrate the critical technologies needed to change the way spent 
nuclear fuel is managed – to build recycling technologies that enhance energy security in a safe 
and environmentally responsible manner, while simultaneously promoting non-proliferation. 
An important supplementary link in the GNEP nonproliferation objective is to track and 
intercept illicit transport of nuclear materials in the expanding global marketplace.  Effective 
proliferation prevention requires improved technology for more effective detection of nuclear 
and radioactive material and more effective monitoring of transportation networks.  This later 
requirement is inherently a multilateral cooperation effort. 
CENTRAL ASIA IS A NEXUS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORT 
Central Asia is poised, by its geography, natural resources, and technical capabilities, to play 
a key role in the expansion of the nuclear power industry and efforts to prevent nuclear 
proliferation.  Central Asia is located between the key supplier state of Russia and the expanding 
user market of East Asia and South Asia (Figure 2).  In addition, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
ranked 3rd and 7th globally in uranium production in 2004 (Table 1).  Finally, there is a high level 
of nuclear-related technical expertise in the region as both a legacy from the Soviet nuclear 
weapons program and on-going commercial and scientific interests.  For example, Kazatomprom 
currently (Figure 2): 
• mines uranium ore 
• processes the ore into U3O8 
• exports U3O8 to Russia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China 
• imports low enriched UF6 from Russia 
• fabricates fuel pellets and exports those to the Ukraine 
This commercial traffic is currently significant and will expand in the future. 
Table 1: 2004 Uranium Production* 
World Rank Country Metric Tonnes 
1 Canada  10,385 
2 Australia 7,917 
3 Kazakhstan 3,300 
4 Niger 3,154 
5 Russia 2,800 
6 Namibia 2,038 
7 Uzbekistan 2,000 
8 U.S. 797 
9 China 769 
10 South Africa 769 
* data from Kazatomprom personal communication 
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Figure 2: As shown by the arrows, Kazatomprom currently supplies U3O8 to Russia, the Republic of 
Korea, Japan, and China and, after receiving low enriched UF6 from Russia, exports fuel pellets to the 
Ukraine. 
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
In response to the threat of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, Uzbekistan has been 
a regional leader in deploying systems to monitor the flow of air, rail, vehicle, and pedestrian traffic 
to detect illicit material. From 2000 until 2004, the Uzbekistan Customs Services, Uzbekistan 
Border Guards, and Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics has worked with Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory on a U.S. Department of Defense funded project to install 
radiation portal monitors as a demonstration project at high priority ports-of-entry.  Since 2004, 
Uzbekistan Customs Services, Uzbekistan Border Guards, DoD, and Washington Group 
International have expanded this to cover all major ports-of entry (Figure 3).  This 
interconnected system provides unprecedented monitoring coverage and serves as a global 
model. 
Concurrent with the development of the national radiation portal monitoring system in 
Uzbekistan are similar but smaller scale efforts in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan.  While each has added value and together they may make a formidable network, 
multilateral cooperation in developing and operating the networks brings significant benefits.  
The Central Asia Technical Workshop to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and 
Radioactive Materials workshop was sponsored by DOE and held in Istanbul, Turkey in 2005 to 
identify these benefits and promote technical cooperation.  Customs and technical experts from 
the five Central Asian states and Unites States Government attended. 
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Figure 3: The international ports-of-entry in Uzbekistan. 
A consensus was reached concerning the importance of collaboration on these smuggling 
issues.  Furthermore, a five-point program to practically achieve this collaboration was 
recommended: 
• Develop an information website that contains a state-by-state inventory of 
relevant legislation and regulations; a survey of radiation detection system 
technical specifications, requirements, and other information of mutual interest, 
and information on training course contents and schedules 
• Develop and implement joint training programs 
• Jointly develop and maintain an illicit nuclear and radioactive materials 
trafficking catalogue 
• Use a risk-based approach in the area of radiation monitoring to identify 
problematic locations and avoid redundancy of efforts 
• Create and support a technically equipped mobile response teams to interdict the 
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials 
IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY 
Within the framework of greatly expanded commercial traffic of radioactive and nuclear 
materials, is a major requirement to improve the detection technology.  More subtle signatures in 
a wider variety of conditions will be encountered.  We present some brief advances below. 
GAMMA-RAY IMAGING SPECTROMETER 
Advances in gamma-ray imaging detectors have increased sensitivity and spatial resolution 
to detect weak radioactive sources that would otherwise be masked by background gamma-ray 
emissions. Gamma-ray imagers are particularly useful when searching for lost, stolen, or hidden 
nuclear material in a large area.  The gamma-ray imaging spectrometer (GRIS) can take gamma-
ray “pictures” of the high-energy radiation emitted by nuclear materials [1, 2].  This instrument 
is useful for a variety of applications, including treaty inspections, mapping radioactive 
contamination, and determining what is inside a suspect object (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: (a) The gamma-ray imaging spectrometer (GRIS) takes pictures of the high-energy gamma 
radiation given off by nuclear materials. The images are encoded on the detector by using a coded 
aperture mask that allows the user to recover the image through a computer program. (b) One potential 
application of GRIS is for nonintrusive treaty inspections. The drawing shows how the instrument might 
be used to inspect a multiple-warhead missile. 
The GRIS system is about half the size of a personal computer and was first developed for 
use in treaty inspections to monitor the location of nuclear missile warheads in a non-intrusive 
manner.  In addition to its use in counterterrorism applications, GRIS is also expected to be 
useful in space to search for distant black holes and in hospitals to better detect, diagnose, and 
treat cancer. 
COMPTON CAMERA 
The Compton camera is yet another type of gamma-ray imager under development (Figure 
5). In addition to taking gamma-ray pictures, this imager should be able to identify very weak 
and typically invisible gamma-ray sources.  The Compton camera operates without a mask or 
collimator, which can block many of the gamma rays emitted from a source.  Instead, gamma 
rays coming from all directions at once are tracked as they scatter inside the detector.  The 
camera’s omnidirectional sensitivity is significantly higher than that of other imaging systems. 
Mathematical algorithms are used to retrace the paths of the gamma rays within the detector, and 
the results reveal the direction of the source.   The main goal for the camera is to detect 
clandestine nuclear materials.  
ADAPTABLE RADIATION AREA MONITOR 
The adaptable radiation area monitor (ARAM) is designed specifically for fast, accurate 
detection without interrupting the flow of traffic and commerce [3].  The ARAM system can 
serve as a stand-alone radiation monitor, or it can be networked into a system of monitors to 
cover a large area.  In addition, the system can be used as a fixed detector to monitor slow-
moving packages, luggage, or pedestrians and as a portable detector. ARAM is optimized to 
detect even small quantities of radioactive materials moving at highway speeds (Figure 6). This 
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capability makes ARAM a crucial element in the effort to protect the nation from radiological 
weapons of mass destruction. 
ARAM is an automatic, highly sensitive system that uses a thallium-doped sodium iodide 
crystal to detect even small amounts of radiation in different scenarios.  The crystal may be 
shielded on as many as four sides to “point” the detector in a particular direction, or it may not be 
shielded at all. The crystal detects full spectral data by dividing the spectrum into 1,024 energy 
bins, or channels. It counts single photons, unlike most other detectors, which collect gross 
counts or divide the spectrum into only 10 channels.  
ARAM’s method, known as list mode, produces large quantities of raw, time-stamped data 
that can be analyzed in any number of ways. List mode increases overall sensitivity and the 
signal-to-noise ratio for spectral data analysis, thereby increasing the probability of a proper 
identification. This feature is particularly important for detecting radioactive materials hidden 
inside moving vehicles.  The software for the ARAM system provides near-real-time results.  
 By acquiring data in list mode, ARAM can produce output with much finer time resolution than 
similar programs.  Fine time resolution offers numerous advantages: Small sources of radiation 
moving at highway speeds can be detected and identified, and the direction of the radiation 
source’s motion may be determined. Fine time resolution also protects the source spectrum from 
contamination by background radiation collected immediately before or after an event. 
Eliminating this spectral contamination results in better data for radionuclide identification.   
When a spectral anomaly is detected, “trigger” algorithms operate on the acquired data and 
produce detailed, easily read event reports.  These advanced algorithms include enhancements to 
improve performance in difficult scenarios, such as roadside monitoring, and to substantially 
reduce false alarms—for example, when the shielding effect from a large truck causes a change 
in the level of background radiation. 
 
Figure 5: The Compton camera’s omnidirectional capability significantly increases gamma-ray 
sensitivity. A gamma ray enters the detector and interacts through Compton scattering until it is fully 
stopped by the photoelectric effect. Mathematical algorithms combining all of the gamma rays’ energies 
(E) at each position (p) are used to identify the path of the gamma-ray source. 
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Monitoring for radiological material involves three steps: detection, localization, and 
identification. Each step could require a different piece of equipment, depending on a system’s 
design. For example, in some systems, a large portal monitor might perform the initial detection 
phase of all vehicles. Suspect shipments would then be inspected using smaller handheld 
detectors to localize and identify the material. The ARAM design combines detection and 
identification into a single step. 
 
Figure 6: The adaptable radiation area monitor (ARAM) can detect small amounts of radioactive material 
hidden in a vehicle moving at highway speeds. 
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